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BENDING THE HEALTH COST CURVE:
THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF THE
INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY
BOARD
Ann Marie Marciarille and J. Bradford DeLong†
ABSTRACT
Underlying today’s and the future’s health-care reform debate is a
consensus that America’s health-care financing system is in a slowmoving but deep crisis: care appears substandard in comparison with
other advanced industrial countries, and relative costs are exploding
beyond all reasonable measures. The Obama Administration’s Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) attempts to grapple with
both of these problems. One of ACA’s key instrumentalities is the
Independent Payment Advisory Board—the IPAB, designed to
discover and authorize ways to reduce the rate of growth of Medicare
and other categories of health spending. The IPAB is a peril. Expert
boards to perform regulatory tasks in the interest of efficiency and
social goals always run a high risk of being captured by the industry
they are supposed to regulate. Even should it succeed at its task of
reducing the rate of growth of Medicare spending, who is to say that
the reductions will not come at a heavy cost in reduced quantity and
effectiveness of medical care? But the IPAB also has promise. The
need for a better process than our current specialist-driven one to
assign value to the medical services provided by Medicare is great.
The bellwether status of Medicare payment systems means that
commercial insurance consumers and payors would also benefit
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mightily from bringing more coherent, technocratic, and costeffectiveness oriented logic to this process. And the current system of
relative Medicare reimbursement rates is, in the judgment of many,
currently well out of whack. We quail when we consider the
magnitude of the tasks the IPAB faces—even its initial task.
Nevertheless, we remain optimistic that this administrative agency
will manage to bend the long-run healthcare cost curve and moderate
future price increases.
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INTRODUCTION
Underlying the current and future health-care reform debate is a
consensus that the American health-care financing system is in a
slow-moving but deep crisis.

It is conventional wisdom among health policy analysts that over
the past generation America’s hybrid health-care system has fallen far
short, measured against the yardstick of health-care expenses and
outcomes in other developed economies. Figure 1 shows an
especially striking slice of the cross-national comparative quantitative
data.1 Up until the end of the 1970s, the United States was, in both
life expectancy and health expenditures, in the outfield but still in the
ballpark relative to its natural yardstick countries. Since the start of
the 1980s, the United States’ trajectory has diverged: life expectancy
1

Lane Kenworthy, America’s Inefficient Health-Care System: Another
Look,
CONSIDER
THE
EVIDENCE
(July
10,
2011),
http://lanekenworthy.net/2011/07/10/americas-inefficient-health-care-system-anotherlook/.
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has risen more slowly and health costs have ballooned much more
rapidly than in the natural yardstick countries.2
The reaction to this slow-moving but deep crisis over the past
generation has been recurrent cries for and attempts to pass
comprehensive health-care reform not just to improve access to health
care and improve the quality of health care but also to “bend the cost
curve”—to control rising costs. The latest attempt to reform
America’s health-care delivery and financing systems is the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). The three most
important foci of the ACA were indeed (1) to improve access to health
care, (2) to improve the quality of health care, and (3) to control costs.
The principal instrumentality for this third goal of the ACA is its
establishment of the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB),
an administrative board whose principal initial task will be the reform
of Medicare’s procedure-based reimbursement system. Medicare
pricing is notoriously byzantine and poorly understood. It is also
desperately important for long-run cost control. It is not an
overstatement to say that the long-term viability of social insurance in
America depends on whether IPAB is able to successfully manage
Medicare pricing.
This Article attempts to lay out the IPAB’s assigned tasks, and
assess its ability to succeed. That is best accomplished by telling the
story of how Medicare currently organizes physician payment, and
how it is to be reformed. We quail when we consider the magnitude
of the tasks the IPAB faces—even its initial task. Nevertheless, we
remain optimistic that this administrative agency will manage to bend
the long-run health-care cost curve, and moderate future price
increases.
Our current political debate about health care is really three
debates.
The first is a debate about the proper reach of the social insurance
state: how much access to how much medical care do we wish our
health-care financing and delivery systems to provide, particularly for
2

The natural yardstick countries for the United States consist, generally, of
other western industrialized countries: Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, Australia,
and New Zealand on the Asian Pacific Rim. Similar patterns of demography, levels
of prosperity, access to technology, and political economy suggest that outcomes
attainable in any of these countries should also be attainable in others. It is worth
noting that the Canadian federal government and the Canadian provinces are also
working to develop a balanced and sustainable health-care growth rate through the
development of a federal-province escalator formula tied in some way to Canada’s
GDP. See Randall Palmer, Canada Seeks a Way to Limit Health-Spending Increases,
REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/14/uscanada-health-spending-idUSTRE7BD2CO20111214.
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those with limited means? The second is a debate about how much of
a role the government will take in the health-care financing and
delivery systems: In other words, markets or bureaucracies?
Government as backstop or provider? Decentralized or centralized?
The subject of this Article is the third debate: How much healthcare spending can Americans afford? And, in the end, how do we
structure our health-care financing system so that we do not conclude
that the ambitions of the social insurance system are quite literally
unaffordable? Today’s political debate about health-care reform is
thus about our desire and ability to “bend the cost curve” as a decisive
factor in the future of government-funded, supported, and regulated
health insurance.
This third debate is especially important because the American
health-care system delivers less bang for more buck than do the
health-care financing and delivery systems of the natural yardstick
nations. American patients are less healthy and pay more. Successful
health-care reform and successful health-care policy management
must require a more efficient health-care financing system. That is
what the ACA’s cost-control provisions are intended to produce.
At the heart of the ACA’s cost-control provisions is the IPAB.3
From 2015 on, in any year which the Medicare Actuary forecasts that
net spending growth will exceed target levels, the IPAB is charged
with developing specific proposals to bring the net growth in
Medicare spending back to target levels.4 The IPAB is forbidden
from raising taxes, increasing Medicare premiums, increasing
Medicare co-payments or deductibles, or in any way rationing health
care.5 Given all these things that the IPAB cannot do, what can the
IPAB do? The low-hanging fruit that the IPAB is intended to first and
most importantly pick is to alter the process by which Medicare sets
its outpatient reimbursement rates.6
The functioning of the IPAB will be an experiment by Congress
3

See Henry J. Aaron, The Independent Payment Advisory Board — Congress’s “Good Deed”, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2377, 2378 (2011).
4
From 2015 to 2019, the target growth rate will be based on a synthesis of
the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (“CPI-U”) and the medical care
expenditures category in the CPI-U. From 2020 forward (based on determination
year 2018 data for proposal year 2019 and implementation year 2020) the target for
spending will be linked to the growth in the national gross domestic product (“GDP
per capita”) plus one percentage point. The transition to a Medicare growth rate
linked to GDP per capita will occur first by linking to growth in health-care prices
and, eventually, by linking to growth in the larger economy. 42 U.S.C. §
1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(i) (2010).
5
Id. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii).
6
See Aaron, supra note 3, at 2378.
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in binding itself to the mast, as Odysseus did when confronted by the
Sirens. In the past Congress has exercised its discretion to reject—or,
rather, to fail to act on—proposals to reform Medicare reimbursement
rates put forward by entities Congress created to advise it. The belief
is that the IPAB process, which removes much of Congress’s
discretionary authority not to act over recommendations on rates, will
lead to Medicare payment decisions that are closer to the social
optimum.7
This ambitious attempt to reform Medicare physician payments
via the IPAB is also the weak point of the ACA. It carries all of the
tension between collective overconsumption and overspending on the
one hand and less-than-socially-optimized individual choices on the
other.8 How can the IPAB’s proposals slow the growth of Medicare
spending without imposing an unacceptably high cost in terms of
reduced quality or amount of care? The IPAB, if it works, will
harness the enormous purchasing power of the federal Medicare
program for the task of bending the cost curve not just for Medicare
alone but for health care in general by reworking physician payment
standards. But if it is to work at acceptable cost it must trigger
improvements in the efficiency of the health-care delivery system and
not just say “no” to cost increases.9
The long-run effects of the IPAB on health-care costs—if the
Board survives, and if its implementation is successful—are projected
to be enormous. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects
that, as of 2040, federal expenditures on health care will be lower by 2
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—or $600 billion each

7

Congressional authority to delegate power under broad general directives
is grounded in the understanding that complex technical problems may require delegation of legislative power in complex technical areas. See generally Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (recognizing that increasingly complex technical problems may require Congressional ability to delegate power under broad
general directives).
8
The problem of distributive justice is particularly acute in a society where
health-care expenditures exceed 16 percent of GDP. The inherent difficulty of allocative decisions is enhanced by our society’s insistence that allocative decisions are not
made—by patients, providers, and payors—on a daily basis. The Long-Term Outlook
for
Health
Care
Spending,
CONG.
BUDGET
OFF.
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/maintext.3.1.shtml (last visited Oct. 26,
2011).
9
Cf. Edmund F. Haislmaier, Compromising Quality: The High Cost of
Government Drug Purchasing, HERITAGE FOUND. 2 (May 25, 2004),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2004/pdf/bg1764.pdf (arguing that government
intervention in the prescription drug market through market access controls diminishes health-care quality).
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year—because of the successful implementation of the ACA.10 If
these forecasts are accurate, the IPAB would slow the growth in costs
of today’s existing federal health-care programs by a third over the
next generation, with the savings coming overwhelmingly from
Medicare.11
The IPAB is a peril. Expert boards to perform regulatory tasks in
the interest of efficiency and social goals always run a high risk of
being captured by the industry they are supposed to regulate. Even if
it should succeed at its task of reducing the rate of growth of Medicare
spending, who is to say that the reductions will not come at a heavy
cost in reduced quantity and quality of medical care?
But the IPAB also has promise. The need for a better process
than our current specialist-driven one to value the medical services
provided by Medicare is great. The bellwether status of Medicare
payment systems means that commercial insurance consumers and
payers would also benefit mightily from bringing more coherent,
technocratic, and cost-effectiveness oriented logic to this piece of the
American government. And the current system of relative Medicare
reimbursement rates is, in the judgment of many, currently well out of
whack.
10

Compare CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK
(2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11579/06-30-LTBO.pdf
with CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK (2009), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10297/06-25-ltbo.pdf. The CBO does not
make it easy for its readers to untangle just how Congressional actions and changes in
the economic environment interact to change its estimates of the long-run path of
federal spending and revenues. However, Table 1-3 on page 15 of the Long-Term
Budget Outlook for 2010 shows a drop in the projected 50-year extended-baseline
fiscal gap between program spending and revenues from 2.6 percent of GDP projected in June 2009 to 0.8 percent of GDP projected in June 2010. THE LONG-TERM
BUDGET OUTLOOK (2010), supra. On the revenue side, revenues are boosted by the
ACA’s tax on high-cost health plans. Id. at 37. On the spending side, even the introduction of subsidies so that low- and moderate-income households without employersponsored insurance can afford to purchase health insurance via the ACA’s Exchanges and the remarkably-large expansion of Medicaid under the ACA are projected to be offset by other savings. Id. at 36. The only place that such significant
other savings could possibly come from in the CBO’s budget arithmetic is from the
effects of the IPAB in bending the cost curve of federal Medicare spending.
11
Savings would come secondarily from reduced Medicaid expenditures.
Improved efficiency in the health-care system would mean that more elderly would be
able to afford their Medicare cost-sharing without having to draw on Medicaid. If
Medicare does indeed serve as a “price leader” in the antitrust sense and private insurance companies key their reimbursement rates to Medicare rates, there will be
additional savings to the Federal government that will come from reduced subsidy
payments to low-income Americans purchasing health insurance through the statelevel health exchanges. However, these potential savings are speculative, and are not
included in CBO estimates.
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We quail when we consider the magnitude of the tasks the IPAB
faces—even its initial task. Nevertheless, we remain optimistic that
this administrative agency will manage to bend the long-run healthcare cost curve and moderate future price increases.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE ROAD TO THE ACA
A.

Yesterday’s Medicare Debate

The origins of our current health-care dilemmas as they affect the
federal budget—especially related to Medicare’s provider
reimbursement system—are found in the 1960s. The presidential
election of 1964 had powerful consequences. Democratic President
Lyndon Baines Johnson not only won election over Republican
nominee Barry Goldwater, Johnson carried with him the largest
supporting congressional majorities since Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.12
One major consequence of Johnson’s victory was the
establishment of Medicare and Medicaid. These two programs
transformed America’s health-care financing system from a system
funded by private charity, out-of-pocket payments, and private
insurance (for those lucky enough to work for large and high-wage
businesses) to the hybrid system we have today.13 Currently, half of
America’s health-care financing system is composed of this mix of
charity, out-of-pocket, and insurance.14 The other half is comprised of
the federal single-payer system for elderly and some disabled persons,
called Medicare, and the federal/state single-payer system for poor
and most disabled persons, called Medicaid.15 Together, they bring us
materially closer to providing a safety net for Americans who find
themselves in need of health care, but lack the financial resources to
pay for it.
12
Given the role played by Barry Goldwater’s decision to challenge establishment Republicans like George Romney and Nelson Rockefeller in creating the
Democratic-heavy legislative environment in 1965 and 1966 that enabled the creation
of Medicare, there is some irony in the role of the Goldwater center’s active presence
in today’s court cases seeking to hobble the reform of Medicare. See generally
Complaint at 30-31, Coons v. Geithner, No.2:10cv1714 (D. Ariz., May 10, 2011)
(challenging Congress’s creation of the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB)
as an unconstitutional delegation of Congressional powers to an unelected, unaccountable executive agency).
13
See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
147–49, 369 (1982).
14
Peter Landers, Public Share of Health Tab to Top 50%, WALL ST. J., Feb.
4, 2010, at A1.
15
LAURA KATZ OLSON, THE POLITICS OF MEDICAID 1, 26 (2010).
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As the bill that was to establish Medicare and Medicaid moved
through Congress in 1965, President Johnson sought to derail a
threatened American Medical Association (AMA) boycott of his
program. Johnson decided to offer doctors participating in Medicare
generously-structured payment rules with little government
oversight.16 Doctors would report to the government what they
charged their non-Medicare patients for the services they provided to
Medicare patients, and the government would pay the bill. There was
no bureaucracy to intrude into doctors’ practices, and there were no
accountants to demand a discount for the large buyer that was the
nationwide government program.17
The particular minimal-supervision payment rules Johnson
established did not survive beyond the early 1980s.18 Nevertheless,
Johnson’s decision to establish this particular Medicare provider
reimbursement system still casts its shadow over Medicare and is one
major source of the current projection fiscally-unsustainable Medicare
cost growth.19 If IPAB succeeds, it will switch us off of the track that
16
DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER:
HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE 201 (2009).
17
In part, this was a response to rent-seeking by well-organized doctors
looking to preserve their incomes and fearing the long-run effects of becoming an
industry subject to heavy government regulation. On the one hand, the government
was promising to boost demand by paying for their services. On the other hand, the
government seemed likely to extend control. For an overview of how groups like
doctors are successful in manipulating the government in such situations, see
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1966). The ideological reaction
to Medicare proposals was remarkably intense, as was the political heat. Consider
Representative Hallock of Indiana’s claim that after the passage of Medicare it would
be impossible to preserve freedom for long in America: “We do not want socialized
medicine . . . . When the American people wants [sic] something from Congress,
regardless of its political complexion, if they make their wants known, Congress does
what the people want . . . .” Eric Zorn, Ronald Reagan on Medicare, Circa 1961.
Prescient Rhetoric or Familiar Alarmist Claptrap?, CHICAGO TRIBUNE BLOG (Sept. 2,
2009,
2:00
PM),
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2009/09/ronald-reagan-onmedicare-circa-1961-prescient-rhetoric-or-familiar-alarmist-claptrap-.html.
Ronald
Reagan agreed, and warned that “behind [Medicare] will come other federal programs
that will invade every area of freedom as we have known it in this country until one
day, as Norman Thomas said, we will wake to find that we have socialism . . . . [W]e
are going to spend our sunset years telling our children, and our children’s children,
what it once was like in America when men were free.” Id.
18
As discussed below, in the 1980s the U.S. government began to tighten its
control over Medicare payments in an attempt to standardize valuation of care in a
process led by Dr. William Hsiao of the Harvard School of Public Health. See infra
Part V.A.
19
As of 2007, before the beginning of the latest health-care reform debate,
the CBO was projecting that in the absence of fundamental reforms to the federal
laws governing the Medicare and Medicaid programs, “[f]ederal spending on Medi-
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Johnson started us down in 1965.
B.

Today’s Health-care Reform Debate

The three debates that make up our current struggle over healthcare reform are conducted at three very different levels of generality.
The first is a debate about moral philosophy.
Whose
responsibility is it to assemble the resources to pay for the medical
care that we will all seek over the course of our lifetimes? How much
of the cost of medical care should properly rest on the individual
seeking care? Does our answer to this change depending on whether
the diseases needing treatment are “in the genes,” “in the lifestyle,” or
appear to be simply accidental bad luck? How much of the cost of
medical care should rest on groups of individuals, using private
insurance companies as instrumentalities to voluntarily associate with
one another to pool and spread risk? And how much of the cost of
medical care is within the proper reach of the social insurance state—
particularly for those with limited means? These questions of
individual responsibility and social justice raised in this debate are
important, divisive, and unresolved. We cannot deal with them in this
paper.
The second is a debate about the proper boundary between the
market and the state. Historically, there have been some areas from
which we have broadly excluded the market. Americans have always
elected or had their elected officials appoint judges and police chiefs,
we have not bought judicial services from the lowest bidder, or
allowed the low-bidding private security company to exercise the
police powers of the state. Similarly, our military has always been a
military of volunteers or conscripts, and not an assembly of mercenary
companies. Education and health care, too, have historically been
overwhelmingly provided by nonprofit or public institutions rather
than by for-profit corporations. Even health insurance was, until
recently, largely nonprofit and mutual. While in much of our society
it is taken for granted that the market will provide, health care has
been somewhat different. Should it have been? Should it still be?
The second debate is about how much of a role the government ought
to take in health-care financing and delivery systems. Should the
government be a provider or merely a financer? Should the system as
care (net of beneficiaries’ premiums) and Medicaid would rise from 4 percent of GDP
in 2007 to 7 percent in 2025, 12 percent in 2050, and 19 percent in 2082.” State
spending on Medicaid would be in addition to federal spending. CONG. BUDGET OFF.,
THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING 2 (2007), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/11-13-LT-Health.pdf.

2012]

BENDING THE HEALTH COST CURVE

85

a whole be decentralized or centralized? How much do we trust
markets, and how much do we trust bureaucracies? Once again, these
questions raised in this debate are important, divisive, and unresolved.
We cannot deal with them in this paper.
The subject of this Article, then, is the third debate. How much
health-care spending can Americans afford? And, in the end, how do
we structure our health-care financing system so that we do not
conclude that the ambitions of the social insurance system are quite
literally unaffordable? The fact that the American health-care system
delivers less bang for more buck than do the health-care financing and
delivery systems of the natural yardstick nations creates a rebuttable
presumption that we are, in some way, doing it wrong. It would be
understandable—a coherent social choice—if American patients were
less healthy but paid less. It would be understandable if American
patients were more healthy and paid more. But Americans are less
healthy and pay more.
This fact leads to the conclusion that, no matter what the results or
positions are in debates one and two, there is space for a health-care
reform and successful health-care policy management that will
produce a different and more efficient health-care financing system.
That is what the ACA is intended to produce. The ACA largely
ducked the first two debates, creating a complicated public-private
system that could accommodate nearly any set of answers to those
two. But it does seek to push the health-care financing system in the
direction of greater efficiency—because the need is urgent.
C.

A Poorly-Performing Health-care System

Our current hybrid health-care system leaves us at any particular
moment with about 50 million Americans without any form of health
insurance coverage.20
As best as economists can determine,
America’s uninsured get perhaps half the care standard for other
20
See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb11-157.html.
Before the recession, over a typical four year period, approximately twice as many
Americans experienced a gap in insurance coverage as suffered from one at any single point in time. Before the recession, about two-thirds as many people as those
uninsured at any point in time lack coverage more than half the time. The recession
beginning in 2008 altered these patterns in ways impacting the reliability of these
types of predictions. See, e.g Pamela Farley Short, Deborah R. Graefe & Cathy
Schoen, Churn, Churn, Churn: How Instability of Health Insurance Shapes America’s Uninsured Problem, COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 4-5 (Nov. 2003),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Short_churn_688.pdf.
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Americans.21 The consequence is that Americans achieve worse
health outcomes than do the citizens of any other rich, industrialized
country. Americans’ life expectancy at birth now lags behind the
industrial country average by approximately four years.22 It is true
that the life expectancy gap is due in part to relatively unhealthy
aspects of the contemporary American lifestyle. Smoking, poor
nutrition, and suburbanization have taken their toll.23 But the gap in
life expectancy has grown far larger over the past generation even as
smoking rates have declined, nutritional standards have improved, and
suburbanization has remained constant.24
Moreover, the uninsured receive a disproportionate amount of
their health care at relatively expensive, low follow-up emergency
rooms, and thus get their care in a way that guarantees low value-formoney.25 This contributes to the other aspect in which American
health care falls well short: America’s health-care costs are much
higher than in other countries. However, other contributing factors
are even more important. The U.S. system has extraordinarily high
administrative costs relative to other nations, because insurance
companies face enormous bottom-line incentives to deny payment for
even the most necessary and appropriate care.26 The U.S. system
compensates and uses the most expensive medical care providers—
specialists—at a rate vastly exceeding other economies.27 Health
21

Catherine Hoffman, Anthony Damico & Rachel Garfield, Research Brief:
Insurance Coverage and Access to Care in Primary Care Shortage Areas, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. 1 (Feb. 2011), http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/8161.pdf.
22
See Kenworthy, supra note 1.
23
EXPLAINING DIVERGENT LEVELS OF LONGEVITY IN HIGH-INCOME
COUNTRIES 3-4 (Eileen M. Crimmins, Samuel H. Preston, & Barney Cohen, eds.,
2011) available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13089 (describing how
the built environment, including the development of suburban housing designed primarily for automotive access, has implications for morbidity and mortality).
24
See generally Gary King & Samir Soneji, The Future of Death in America,
25 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 1 (July 1, 2011), http://www.demographicresearch.org/volumes/vol25/1/25-1.pdf.
25
See, e.g. Sarah Miller, The Effect of Insurance on Emergency Room Visits:
An Analysis of the 2006 Massachusetts Health Reform 3, 6 (University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign Working Paper Series, Sept. 1, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1711502.
26
See Mark J. Browne, Evidence of Adverse Selection in Health Care Markets, 59 J. RISK & INS. 13, 27 (1992); see also Scot J. Paltrow, Insurers’ Black Box:
Now-Secret Claims Denied Rates Could Tell Consumers a Lot About Their Insurance
Company,
CTR.
FOR
A M.
PROGRESS
1
(Oct.
21,
2009),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/10/pdf/insurers_black_box.pdf.
27
See generally AMITABH CHANDRA & KATHERINE BAICKER, THE
PRODUCTIVITY OF PHYSICIAN SPECIALIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE MEDICARE
PROGRAM
(2004),
available
at
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~kbaicker/BaickerChandraSpecialists.pdf ; see also CHRIS
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policy experts argue about the impact of pressure to provide more and
more sophisticated care that is reinforced by the medical malpractice
system. The general consensus, though, points instead to a lack of
knowledge and consensus about which procedures and protocols are
actually effective and appropriate.28 One informed guess indicates
that about one-third of all care provided carries a social cost greater
than the benefit to the patient. Another informed guess states that a
substantial part of health-care spending is at best neutral from the
perspective of likely patient outcomes.29
In addition, the performance of the American health-care system,
relative to other countries, is likely to become worse over time. Nearly
all projections anticipate that American medical costs will also
continue to rise, and at a rate faster than that of other industrialized
economies.30
D.

Tomorrow’s Reform of the Health-care Financing
System

Breaking this trend—bending the cost curve—is thus essential.
Bending the cost curve means making changes to the health-care
delivery and finance system to decrease the rate at which health-care
spending increases.31 Even in the universe of government funded
L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34175, U.S. HEALTH
CARE SPENDING: COMPARISON WITH OTHER OECD COUNTRIES 41 (2007), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34175_20070917.pdf.
28
DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 107 (2004); the book’s immensely valuable technical
appendix
is
also
available
at
http://economics.harvard.edu/faculty/cutler/files/technical_appendix.pdf. See generally LEIGHANNE OLSEN ET AL., LEARNING WHAT WORKS: INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED
FOR
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 57 (2011), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12214 (providing an overview of the
many publications that have highlighted the limited quality of the evidence developed
to guide health-care decision makers).
29
Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform: A Graphic Novel, BOSTON GLOBE,
http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/health/gallery/health_care_graphic_novel/
(last
visited Jan. 23, 2012). See also Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Temporal Trends in
Rates of Patient Harm Resulting from Medical Care, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2124,
2130 (2010). Perhaps 75,000 people a year in America die from medical error. Ellen
Nolte & C. Martin McKee, Measuring the Health of Nations: Updating an Earlier
Analysis, 27 HEALTH AFF. 58, 63 (2008).
30
See, e.g. 2011 Global Medical Trends Survey Report, TOWERS WATSON
(2011),
http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/3585/Towers-Watson-GlobalMedical-Trends-Svy-Rpt.pdf.
31
Though the origins of the phrase “bending the cost curve” are obscure,
William Safire attributes the migration of the aviation reference to being behind the
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health insurance, Americans are uncertain who can bend the cost
curve, and for good reason. Short of absolute fiat, the health-care cost
curve will not improve without changes in provider, payor, and
consumer behavior. In a hybrid public/private health-care system—
such as our own—many private players have a role in determining
government funded health-care expenditures. It is a collective action
problem,32 amenable only to collective, systemic solutions to
overcome collective overconsuming and overspending.33
In the absence of successful implementation of comprehensive
health-care reform, observers have noted five features of the ongoing
process of health-care cost growth.
First, rapidly-rising publicly funded insurance health-care
expenditures are not being driven by a shifting of costs away from
private payors —charity, out-of-pocket, and private insurance—to the
public. Private and public costs and expenditures are rising in
tandem, with the public side, if anything, better at achieving
efficiencies and evading cost-shifting in health-care provision.34
Second, the destructive adverse selection arms race among the
private insurance companies and others continues, with the company
that does least well paying a disproportionate share of the bills, and
winding up in the red. The result is that much of the increase in
health-care costs on the private side is directed towards administrative
overhead in order to further exploit adverse selection. There are, so
far, no signs that this arms race has come to an end or even stabilized
at a constant proportional share of health-care expenditures. The
incentives in the current system for insurers to find ways not to pay
for the sick, and for the healthy to find ways not to pay into the
system are simply too great35.

power curve to no one less than President Obama himself. William Safire, Bending
the Curve, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at MM14.
32
Austin Frakt, Bending the Curve: Conflict and Skepticism, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST
(Oct.
6,
2010,
10:00AM),
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/bending-the-curve-conflict-andskepticism/.
33
Id.
34
CONG. BUDGET OFF., KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH
INSURANCE
REFORM
PROPOSALS
19
(Dec.
2008),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9924/12-18-KeyIssues.pdf.
35
See generally Karen Eggleston & Anupa Bir, Measuring Selection Incentives in Managed Care: Evidence From the Massachusetts State Employee Insurance
Program, 76 J. RISK & INS. 159, 161 (2009) (explaining how capitation only exascerbates insurer cherry picking); see also Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for
the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks Into the Health Insurance Pool With An Idea
From Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 2010 WIS. LAW REV.79 (2010)
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Third, the growing gap in life expectancy between rich and poor
Americans strongly suggests that the care gap between the insured and
the uninsured is growing as well.36
Fourth, the aging of the population and the resulting increase in
per capita costs of care as those suffering from the diseases of aging
become a larger and larger share of the population—while very real—
is not a primary driver of increased costs.37
Instead, fifth, the principal driver of anticipated system-wide cost
increases is the creation and deployment of additional medical care
technologies and protocols.
Physicians and insurers are the
gatekeepers who decide when and how additional medical care
technologies and protocols will be deployed38.
II.

THE LOGIC OF THE ACA

Thus the ACA is motivated by a desire to fix the two major
deficiencies of the American health-care financing system measured
against the yardstick of other OECD economies.
A.

Dealing with the Problem of Uninsurance

The ACA proposes to address the problem of the uninsured’s lack
of access to affordable care by, first, a large expansion of the
federal/state Medicaid program.39 This will definitely not reduce
health-care costs: providing 15 million people with financing so that
they can go to the doctor more often is not a cost-reducing measure.
The ACA proposes, second, to address the problem of the middle
class uninsured’s inability to purchase affordable insurance by
creating fifty state-specific health exchanges, each of which will
increase bargaining power and mitigate adverse selection. The hope
is that these reforms will increase competition in the health insurance
(discussing the one-third of young men who will not voluntarily purchase health
insurance).
36
EXPLAINING DIVERGENT LEVELS OF LONGEVITY IN HIGH-INCOME
COUNTRIES, supra note 23, at 117.
37
LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING, supra note 19, at 3.
38
Christine Lane & Barbara J. Turner, The Good (Gatekeeper), the Bad
(Gatekeeper), and the Ugly (Situation), 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 320, 320 (1999);
Thomas Bodenheimer et al., Primary Care Physicians Should Be Coordinators, not
Gatekeepers, 281 JAMA 2045, 2045 (1999); Melvin Kirschner, I Am a Physician,
Don’t Call Me a Gatekeeper, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 3, 1995), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-09-03/local/me-41803_1_patient-care.
39
See Chris L. Peterson, Medicaid Coverage Expansions Under PPACA:
Who
and
How
Much,
CONG.
RES.
SERV.
(May
7,
2010),
http://www.nhpf.org/library/handouts/Peterson.slides_05-07-10.pdf.
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markets by diminishing the bargaining power of large insurers vis-àvis individuals and small groups. If successful, administrative costs
will fall greatly once community rating40 and the individual mandate
reduce the incentive to engage in the adverse selection arms race.
Private health-care costs will decline, as will government costs, to the
extent that those purchasing health insurance on the exchanges or
elsewhere benefit from the federal subsidy pool. But the exchanges
and the federal subsidy pool will also make it possible for
approximately 20 million more people to go to the doctor more often.
Once again, providing millions of people with financing so that they
can go to the doctor more often is not a cost-reducing measure.41
The cost-saving and deficit-reducing measures in the ACA are
found elsewhere.
B.

Reducing the Deficit: Revenues from the ACA

Nobody knows how effective the ACA will be. It depends on the
details of implementation, the functioning of the health-care market,
and future changes that are unknowable. The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) has, however, projected the impact of the ACA which
serves as a useful baseline and starting point.42 We consider the CBO
projections below.
One of the largest single projected effects of the ACA is a federal
tax revenue increase of $600 billion per year by 2040.43 This increase
is due to a substantial excise tax on “high cost” health insurance
plans.44 This tax can be thought of as a partial reduction in the tax
40

Community rating requires health insurers offer every applicant in the pool
the opportunity to purchase insurance at a uniform community-wide price. The opposite of community rating is found in products that are individually underwritten and
individually priced. Uwe R. Reinhardt, Is ‘Community Rating’ in Health Insurance
Fair?, ECONOMIX: N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 1, 2010, 7:01 AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/is-community-rating-in-healthinsurance-fair/.
41
Katherine Balcker & Amitabh Chandra, Misconceptions About Health
Insurance Markets and Health Reform, TIAA-CREF INSTITUTE 2 (Feb. 2011),
http://www.tiaacref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp_docs/documents/docu
ment/tiaa02029346.pdf.
42
CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN ANALYSIS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 23-27 (Nov. 30, 2009),
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/doc10781/11-30-Premiums.pdf; CONG. BUDGET
OFF., CBO’S 2011 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 25 (2011), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/122xx/doc12212/06-21-LongTerm_Budget_Outlook.pdf.
43
See THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK (2010), supra note 10, at 61.
44
Note that the ACA’s “Cadillac Tax” excise tax on the excess costs highcost health insurance plans does not begin to take effect until 2018. Jenny Gold,
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preference provided to employer-sponsored health insurance, a
reduction that will grow over time.45 As of 2040, if the ACA is fully
implemented, and if its tax provisions are not suspended, postponed,
or moderated, only about half of the health-care costs of those
receiving employer-sponsored insurance will qualify for the current
tax preference. The other half will then take the form of either
employee out-of-pocket expenses or employer payments via vehicles
that do not qualify for tax preference.46
This substantial excise tax on “high cost” health insurance plans is
projected by the CBO to powerfully reduce the share of the federal
deficit attributable to the health-care sector.47 The tax’s supporters
hope that it will boost economic growth in other sectors by reducing
the quantity of Treasury bonds issued by the government to cover its
deficit.48 Households and businesses seeking to hold bonds will then
find themselves with a powerful incentive to lend money to
businesses seeking to improve efficiency and profitability through
greater capital intensity, and that increased productive efficiency
shows itself as faster economic growth outside the health-care
sector.49 The magnitude of these economic consequences is greatly
uncertain and a matter of political dispute.50 By convention, the CBO
does not take these possible changes in economic growth into account
in its projections.
‘Cadillac’ Insurance Plans Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 18, 2010),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/March/18/Cadillac-Tax-ExplainerUpdate.aspx.
45
For an argument about why it is very dangerous to eliminate the tax preference for employer-sponsored insurance at least until effective universal coverage
has been established, see David M. Cutler, J. Bradford DeLong & Ann Marie Marciarille, Why Obama’s Health Plan Is Better, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at A25.
46
Congressional Budget Office informal communication with authors. Thus
the “Cadillac” name of the excise tax on high-cost health plans is, in the long run, a
misnomer. The tax starts out as a tax on “Cadillac” health insurance plans, but as
costs rise over time the tax applies to a larger and larger share of Americans. It is
unclear whether the legislative coalition needed to sustain this tax over the long run
will maintain itself.
47
It is the driver of the CBO’s projected reduction in the fifty-year fiscal gap
from the 2.6 percent of GDP that it forecast in 2009 to the 0.8 percent of GDP that it
forecast in 2010. See THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK (2009), supra note 10, at 7;
THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK (2010), supra note 10, at 60.
48
Benjamin M. Friedman, Crowding Out or Crowding In? Economic Consequences of Financing Government Budget Deficits, 1978 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY 593, 640-41 (1978).
49
See Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,
70 Q. J. ECON. 65 (1956).
50
See Alan J. Auerbach, Dynamic Scoring: An Introduction to the Issues, 95
AM. ECON. REV. 421 (2005).
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This substantial excise tax on “high cost” health insurance plans
does create some incentives for private insurers to “bend the healthcare cost curve” directly. Formerly, insurance companies that devoted
additional resources to marketing rather than cost control might well
have found their profits increasing as a smaller proportional margin of
prices over costs was spread out over a larger customer base. Once
the excise tax on “high cost” health insurance plans has gone into
effect, however, failure to control costs would be heavily taxed.51 It
would be more profitable to devote corporate resources to cost control
rather than marketing in order to keep premiums below the cap at
which the tax begins to bind.
C.

Bending the Medicare Cost Curve through the
IPAB

But the major projected bending of the health-care cost curve
comes elsewhere in the ACA. The individual mandate prevents
insurance companies from charging some households higher
premiums while inducing other households to “go naked” without
health insurance, to boost insurer profitability via adverse selection.52
Such business practices come at the price of very high administrative
costs. The ACA will eliminate them.53 This will bend the cost curve as
far as the private insurance market is concerned.
But, more importantly, the ACA through the IPAB is intended,
and projected, to alter Medicare. The IPAB’s first major task is to
alter the process by which Medicare sets reimbursement rates. Thus,
through the IPAB, the ACA is an experiment in binding ourselves to
51

If, indeed, the failure to control costs is the source of variation in health
plan premiums. There is some evidence that only some of the variation in cost of
family coverage can be explained by actuarial value of the plan. Jon Gabel et al.,
Taxing Cadillac Health Plans May Produce Chevy Results, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1, 5
(2010).
52
LUCIAN WULSIN JR. & ADAM DOUGHERTY, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH
BUREAU, CRB 09-007, INDIVIDUAL MANDATE: A BACKGROUND REPORT 3-4 (Apr.
2009), available at www.library.ca.gov/crb/09/09-007.pdf; Achim Wambach, Rationing Health Care and the Complementarity of Private and Public Insurance, in
RATIONING IN MEDICINE: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS 127, 128-29
(Friedrich Breyer, Hartmut Kliemt & Felix Thiele, eds., 2002) (discussing how rationing by price in insurance markets is both an interesting and troubling phenomenon).
53
The importance of the individual mandate to acquire coverage is as a centerpiece of any cost-growth reduction strategy. See Matthew Buettgens, et al., Why
the Individual Mandate Matters: Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues,
URB. INST. 3, 6-7 (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412280individual-mandate-matters.pdf (illustrating that, without an individual mandate, the
ACA would still cut the number of uninsured, but by less than 50 percent).
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socially-optimal Medicare payment decisions by removing much of
Congress’s discretion on these matters.
The stakes are high. The long-run effects of the IPAB are
projected to be enormous. This extraordinarily ambitious attempt to
reform Medicare physician payments will serve as an object lesson,
demonstrating the incredible tension between collective
overconsumption and overspending on the one hand, and less-thansocially-optimized individual choices on the other. Consumers tend to
recognize the need for rational decision making on Medicare spending
allocation,54 at least until confronted with their own denial of
Medicare specialty services. Specialty physicians align their interests
with those of Medicare beneficiaries scared of being denied, in what
Tom Daschle described as the “patient-provider pincer movement”55
which is designed to maximize Medicare resources for those
specialists. The role of specialty physician payments in fueling
Medicare cost inflation and the role of specialty physicians in shaping
Medicare health-care delivery and outcomes reveal the strengths and
weaknesses of trying to reform our hybrid health-care system.
III.

THE INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD
A.

Origins of the IPAB

The IPAB is designed as an independent, executive branch board
directed to recommend savings for Medicare if the per capita growth
in Medicare spending exceeds defined target growth rates.56 These
target growth rates are designed to bring Medicare’s growth rate in
line with general inflation rates.
The IPAB’s scope of authority includes the mandate to issue
recommendations to Congress to reduce Medicare’s spending growth
rate.57
These recommendations are then fast-tracked for
54
Avik Roy, NYT/CBS Poll: Plurality of Americans Favor Reduced Medicare
Spending,
FORBES
(Apr.
22,
2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2011/04/22/nytcbs-poll-plurality-of-americansfavor-reduced-medicare-spending/.
55
TOM DASCHLE WITH SCOTT S. GREENBERGER & JEANNE M. LAMBREW,
CRITICAL: WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THE HEALTH-CARE CRISIS 114 (2008).
56
During its first five years, if overall medical inflation does not exceed
general inflation, IPAB may not issue binding proposals but it may issue advisory
recommendations. Thereafter, IPAB must issue proposals if Medicare costs per beneficiary grow faster than one percentage point per year plus GDP per capita, and may
not if they do not. James Ebeler et al., The Independent Payment Advisory Board: A
New Approach to Controlling Medicare Spending, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 6 (Apr.
2011), http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8150.pdf.
57
42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(b)(2) (2010).
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Congressional consideration. If Congress does not act in a timely
fashion, the recommendations must be implemented by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS). The IPAB’s provider targets
go into effect in 2020, but exclude acute care hospitals. Variously
described as “recusal legislation,”58 governance by “selfabnegation,”59 and “statutory entrenchment,”60 the IPAB’s default
authority is the source of its power.
Medicare is a creation of Congress and has been governed as such
since its inception in 1966. The governance process for Medicare has
always been intensely political.
Congressional architects of
America’s health-care policy have long feared Congress’s technical
incompetence to deal with the highly complex issues of health-care
spending. To help it deal with these issues, Congress thus created and
has relied on its own highly-respected advisory body—the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC).61
MedPAC resulted from the merger of the Prospective Payment
Assessment Commission and the Physician Payment Review
Commission (PPRC) in 1997.62 PPRC was established in 1985 to
advise Congress on ways to adapt or replace the system used to pay
for physician services with a prospective payment system. Congress
was the agent of physician payment reform, however, and PPRC
merely offered analysis and advice on the scope and pace of
implementation of physician payment system reform.63
MedPAC has maintained its credibility, but it has always been an
advisory body, lacking real authority. When push comes to shove,
those whom its recommendations would disadvantage have lobbied
Congress, and its recommendations for Medicare system
58

Michael J. Teter, Recusal Legislating: Congress’s Answer to Institutional
Stalemate, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 (2011).
59
Aaron, supra note 3, at 2377.
60
See Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Superstatutory Entrenchment: A Positive and Normative Interrogatory, 120 YALE LAW JOURNAL
ONLINE 387, 396 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/962.pdf.
61
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) is an independent Congressional agency established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 to advise
the U.S. Congress on issues affecting the Medicare program. The Commission’s
statutory mandate is quite broad: in addition to advising the Congress on payments to
private health plans participating in Medicare and providers in Medicare’s traditional
fee-for-service program, MedPAC is also tasked with analyzing access to care, quality of care, and other issues affecting Medicare. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub.
L. 105-33, Sec. 4022, H.R. 2015-100 (1997).
62
Ebeler et al., supra note 56, at 1, 23 n.6.
63
Thomas R. Oliver, Analysis, Advice, and Congressional Leadership: The
Physician Payment Review Commission and the Politics of Medicare, 18 J. HEALTH
POL., POL’Y & L. 113, 114 (1993).
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rationalization and cost saving have not been implemented.64
In the summer of 2009, both Senator Jay Rockefeller and the
Office of Management and Budget Director, Peter Orszag, proposed
to strengthen MedPAC by making it into an executive branch
commission with specific savings targets and authority, not just to
make recommendations to Congress (which Congress would then
ignore), but to initiate action. Their proposals became what is now the
IPAB: an independent board in the executive branch, consisting of
fifteen members appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The IPAB members cannot engage in any
other employment; thus they cannot be otherwise-employed members
of the health policy community. Given the enemies that the IPAB’s
cost-cutting recommendations are likely to make in the provider and
insurance communities, members of the board are not likely to be
employed in the future by providers or insurers. An appointment to
the IPAB is thus likely to be a career-ending, capstone position, at
least for those of its members pursuing careers in health-care
finance.65
The IPAB represents the latest, and strongest, iteration of an
independent, expert panel dedicated to reducing the per capita rate of
growth in Medicare spending. Created by the ACA as the watchdog
of target growth rates for Medicare, the IPAB will spring to life in
2012. Based on the assumption that Congress and the federal
administrative agencies have proven themselves too accommodating
to the provider, payor, and consumer forces that propel an everincreasing Medicare spending growth rate, the IPAB is designed to
limit the growth of Medicare spending as well as improve the
governance structure for Medicare.66 Demonstrating what Henry
Aaron has called the “legislative statesmanship” of “selfabnegation,”67 Congress has insulated the IPAB from legislative
intrusiveness68 as well as from constituent influence.69
64

See Ebeler, supra note 56, at 3.
The simultaneous requirements of substantive expertise and restrictions on
other income-producing activity may help to account for the lack of nominees to date.
Alternatively, it may make no sense to even attempt an appointment until the fate of
the ACA is resolved at the Supreme Court. Jennifer Haberkorn, Health Policy Brief:
The Independent Payment Advisory Board, HEALTH AFF. 2 (Dec. 2011),
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_59.pdf.
66
Id. at 1.
67
Aaron, supra note 3, at 2377.
68
See id. at 2377-78.
69
Steve Benen, The Independent Advisory Board Comes Under Fire, WASH.
MONTHLY
(Apr.
20,
2011,
12:30
PM),
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2011_04/029035.php.
65
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According to David Nather of Politico, “IPAB has become a huge
lightning rod.”70 Already, there are calls to strengthen the role of the
IPAB71 and calls to repeal it.72 But it is a Medicare reform lightning
rod for a variety of reasons. The rhetoric of the IPAB’s supporters
and detractors focuses on how it is designed to work, who will serve,
and whether it will be effective.
B.

The Operation of IPAB

The ACA sets target growth rates for Medicare spending
beginning in 2014.73 These growth rate targets serve as triggers for
IPAB’s authority to submit specific Medicare savings
recommendations to Congress—but they are more than mere
“recommendations” that Congress will then ignore. Congress must
respond or else the proposals automatically go into effect.74
By the force of default implementation,75 the IPAB’s assignment
is clearly to tame Medicare outpatient spending growth,76 and bring it
70
David Nather, Medicare Cost-Cutting Job Could Be Worst in D.C.,
POLITICO.COM
(May
14,
2011),
https://
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/54952.html.
71
NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESP. & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 36
(Dec.
2010),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/_photos/2010/12/01/TheMomentofTruth.pdf;
Remarks by the President on Fiscal Policy, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Apr. 13, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/13/remarks-president-fiscalpolicy.
72
Cal. Health Care Found., Medicare Cost-Cutting Board Faces Mounting
Opposition
in
Congress,
CAL.
HEALTHLINE
(Apr.
18,
2011),
http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2011/4/18/medicare-costcutting-boardfaces-mounting-opposition-in-congress.aspx (citing Julian Pecquet, House Democrats’ Defections Threaten Obama’s Medicare Advisory Board, HEALTHWATCH (Apr.
15, 2011, 11:49 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/medicare/156343democrats-defections-threaten-obamas-medicare-savings-gambit).
73
For 2015 through 2019, Medicare spending per capita’s target is the average of general and medical inflation. Brad Vaida, The IPAB: How Could It Change
Medicare?,
KAISER
HEALTH
NEWS
(May
8,
2008),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/May/09/ipab-faq.aspx. For 2020 and
later, the target is the gross domestic product plus one percentage point, though the
President has floated a proposal to tighten IPAB’s target in later years to GDP plus
0.5 percentage point. Id.
74
42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(b)(3) (2010).
75
See Ebeler, supra note 56, at 9.
76
ACA’s exclusions of inpatient and outpatient acute care hospital services,
inpatient rehabilitation, psychiatric facilities, long-term care hospitals, and hospices
from IPAB scrutiny until 2020 leaves the focus of immediate IPAB scrutiny on Medicare Advantage, Medicare Part D, skilled nursing facilities, home health, dialysis,
ambulance, ambulatory surgical center services, and durable medical equipment. Id.
at 10.
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in line with general inflation rates while also maintaining or
enhancing Medicare beneficiary access to quality care. The goal is
not to cap Medicare’s spending growth rate so as to align it with
general inflation rates, but rather right-size it relative to other sectors
of the economy.77
For 2015 to 2019, the target growth rate for Medicare spending
per capita is the average of overall inflation and medical inflation.78
Thereafter the target is one percentage point more than the per capita
GDP growth rate. Every year, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) Actuary must determine whether the Medicare
growth rate is exceeding the target growth rate. If it is, the IPAB is
required to develop and submit a proposal to bring Medicare spending
growth below the target rate.79
The IPAB must submit its annual proposal for reducing Medicare
spending growth by January 15. If it fails to do so, the Secretary of
HHS must submit a proposal meeting the requirements by January 25.
In either event, the Secretary must transmit and MedPAC must
comment on the IPAB proposal by March 1, after which the proposal
is considered by Congress.80 In the event Congress does not act on
the proposal, the Secretary of HHS is required to implement the
recommendations for the subsequent fiscal year.81
The tension between the IPAB’s obligation to monitor and master
Medicare’s spending growth rate and its obligation to maintain or
77

Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
79
A technical note: ACA does not strictly require IPAB to recommend proposals to keep Medicare spending below target growth rates in all circumstances.
Rather, it requires IPAB to reduce Medicare spending by the amount of the excess
over the target only up to a specified percentage maximum that is unlikely to be
reached. The fear is that should costs explode for some unknown reason, IPAB
would then be forced by law into draconian and counterproductive economies. The
Congressional architects of ACA seek to avoid that eventuality.
80
There has been very little discussion of the fact that the legislative language appears to grant the Secretary of Health and Human Services the powers and
authority of the IPAB in the event that the IPAB itself deadlocks and fails to carry out
its mission. The powers that Congress may delegate to an independent board are
different than the powers Congress may delegate to a cabinet officer.
81
IPAB is prohibited from: (1) increasing Medicare cost sharing or premiums; (2) rationing health care; or (3) restricting benefits or modifying eligibility criteria. It cannot reduce payment rates for providers and suppliers below levels already
specified elsewhere in ACA until 2020. In its first five years, therefore, IPAB is
likely to focus on aspects of Medicare like durable medical equipment, dialysis, prescription drugs, Medicare Advantage, and home health. The savings that the CBO
expects from the IPAB up until 2020 are thus not overwhelmingly large. Afterwards,
however, the potential for major reforms greatly increases. See Ebeler, supra note 56,
at 7-8, 10.
78
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enhance beneficiary services is framed by the ACA’s limits on the
IPAB’s authority. The IPAB may not recommend rationing of health
care, raising Medicare beneficiary premiums, cost sharing, or
modifying eligibility criteria. The joke that the IPAB is an acronym
for “Death Panel” illustrates the concern and confusion over the
IPAB’s statutory and regulatory role.82 The IPAB, as laid out in the
ACA, is constrained in its choice of weapons to control Medicare
spending growth.83 In addition, Medicare specifically withholds the
power to regulate the practice of medicine from the federal
government.84 All of this raises the question of whether the IPAB is
too strong or not strong enough to accomplish its goal of bending the
cost curve on Medicare cost inflation.
Congress must consider the IPAB’s proposals under special
expedited procedures.85 The committees86 and the full House and
Senate cannot consider any amendment that would change or repeal
the Board’s recommendations unless those changes meet the same
fiscal targets that the IPAB met (however, three-fifths of Senators can
override this restriction). The Senate must vote on the proposal by the
end of no more than thirty legislative hours.87 The Senate must vote
on any conference report or amendment by the end of no more than
ten legislative hours.88
The ACA and the economic realities of Medicare spending have
thus set the stage for the IPAB’s first major assignment. Its initial
agenda cannot include Medicare inpatient services. Its agenda is
82

See, e.g. David Catron, IPAB is an Acronym for ‘Death Panel’, AMER.
SPECTATOR (Apr. 22, 2011, 6:09 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/2011/04/22/ipabis-an-acronym-for-death-p.
83
See supra note 79.
84
Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1801, 79 Stat.
286, 291 (1965).
85
42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(d)(4) (2010).
86
“When introduced in the House, an implementing bill is to be referred to
House Committees on Energy and Commerce and on Ways and Means. In the Senate, the measure is to be referred to the Committee on Finance.” “Fast Track” Parliamentary Procedures Relating to the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB):
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Health, 112th
Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of Christopher M. Davis, Analyst on Congress and the
Legislative
Process,
Congressional
Research
Service),
available
at
http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/Health/071311/Da
vis.pdf.
87
The thirty-hour decision deadline is tolled by the delivery of IPAB’s formal recommendations from HHS to Congress. Id. at 13-14.
88
Congress has reserved to itself the opportunity for a one-time fast-track
joint resolution to dissolve IPAB in January of 2017. Dissolving IPAB via fast-track
requires: (a) passage by August 15, 2017; and (b) the votes of three-fifths of members
in the House and Senate. Id. at 9, 16-19.
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limited to payments reform. Given that, the intersection of Medicare
outpatient services and payment system reform is found at the
Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS). This makes it likely that
the IPAB, at its launch, will focus on the MPFS. The key question is
how the IPAB might wield its power to tame Medicare spending
growth.
IV.

THE IPAB AND THE MEDICARE PHYSICIAN FEE
SCHEDULE
A.

The Importance of the Medicare Physician Fee
Schedule

The architects of the ACA designed the IPAB to undertake
reforming MPFS as a stepping stone to overall value-based payment
reform. Migration of the health-care financing system to value-based
payment will be neither easy nor quick.89 Value-based payment
systems in the future are likely to build on the current MPFS; the
current reimbursement practices are the most obvious place to start. It
is one of the few places where the stakes are large enough to bend the
health-care inflation cost curve.The ACA proposes to slow Medicare
spending growth through a comprehensive implementation of
Medicare’s prospective payment system in the realm of physician
services through the efforts of the IPAB. As Gerard Anderson et al.
observed, “[a]lthough the huge federal Medicare program . . .
possess[es] some monopsonistic purchasing power . . . the highly
fragmented buy side of the U.S. health system is relatively weak.”90
The IPAB’s assignment is to harness some of the monopsonistic
purchasing power of the federal Medicare program by reworking
physician payment standards. What role might the IPAB might play
in the near-term revision of the MPFS? What limits are there to the
IPAB’s capacity to rapidly take action to bend the cost curve on
health-care inflation?
Curtailing Medicare spending growth is not a novel goal. But
past efforts to contain Medicare spending growth on physician
services have been notably less successful than, for example, efforts to

89
Robert A. Berenson, Out of Whack: Pricing Distortions in the Medicare
Physician Fee Schedule, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND. 1 (Sept.
2010), http://nihcm.org/pdf/NIHCM-EV-Berenson_FINAL.pdf.
90
Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is
So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 102 (2003).
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contain Medicare spending growth for inpatient hospital services.91
Medicare operates on a system of administered pricing that, with
varying degrees of success, has most recently attempted to slow
spending growth by the use of prospective payment systems.
Although much-maligned, Medicare’s prospective payment systems
have had some success in slowing Medicare spending growth for
inpatient services,92 transitory success in slowing Medicare spending
growth for post-acute care,93 and little success in slowing Medicare
spending growth for physician services.94 It is worth understanding
why the effectiveness of Medicare’s prospective payment system has
been particularly blunted in the areas of physician services. The
question is complex, as is the answer. But it is worth asking because
it is Medicare’s prospective payment system that has been most
effective at slowing Medicare spending growth—not managed care,
not changes in cost-sharing, and not industry-sponsored voluntary
efforts.95
Why are Medicare physician services the lynchpin to slowing
Medicare spending growth? First, a large percentage of health costs
are within the discretionary control of physicians,96 and the average
primary care physician’s discretionary referrals display tremendous
geographic and practice context variance.97 If Medicare does not
control the volume of spending physicians direct, Medicare will find it
difficult to tame costs.98 Second, despite a substantial body of
empirical analysis on the control physicians exercise over
discretionary health-care spending, Medicare physician payments
have not been trending downward.99 Finally, the failure to give
91
Chapin White, Why Did Medicare Spending Growth Slow Down?, 27
HEALTH AFF. 793, 795 (2008).
92
Id. at 795-96.
93
Id. at 796-97.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 793; Stuart Guterman et al., Using Medicare Payment Policy to
Transform the Health System: A Framework for Improving Performance, 28 HEALTH
AFF. w239 (2009).
96
Brenda Sirovich, et al, Discretionary Decision Making by Primary Care
Physicians and the Cost of U. S. Health Care, 27 HEALTH AFF. 813, 814 (2008).
97
Howard Brody, Medicine’s Ethical Responsibility for Health Care Reform—The Top Five List, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 284 (2010).
98
Austin Frakt, Health Care Cost Control is Hard, and Humbling,
INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST
(Nov.
7,
2010,
7:00
AM),
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/health-care-cost-control-is-hard-andhumbling/.
99
Uwe Reinhardt, The Annual Drama of the ‘Doc Fix,’ ECONOMIX: N.Y.
TIMES
BLOG
(Dec.
17,
2010,
6:00AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/the-annual-drama-of-the-doc-fix /.
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physicians who participate in Medicare100 a financial and performance
stake in efforts to control Medicare spending has left those most able
to “bend the cost curve” on Medicare spending growth outside the
circle of interest and power capable of exerting this control.101
B.

What Is the Problem to Which the IPAB Is the
Solution?

The IPAB is designed as an independent fifteen-member board of
the executive branch. The IPAB’s members, most importantly, are to
be full-time federal employees excluded from outside employment,
and paid the salary of senior executives in the federal government.102
Each member will be a presidential appointee with relevant expertise
in health care, health economics, health research and technology,
health insurance, and employer sponsors of health insurance. The
President is required to seek the advice and consent of various
Congressional leaders in making twelve of these appointments, but
retains exclusive authority over three of these six year
appointments.103
Given the duration of the exclusive service requirement, service
on the IPAB might have to be seen as a career capstone project.
Limiting likely service on the IPAB to those at the end of their career
narrows the field of potential appointees.104
The purpose of excluding outside employment is obviously to
avoid any conflict of interest, though why prior service and retirement
packages comprised of investment holdings in the entity are not a
100
These individuals are properly referred to as physicians who “accept
Medicare assignment.” 42 C.F.R. § 414.50(b)(2) (2009).
101
See Steve M. Shortell, Bending the Cost Curve: A Critical Component of
Health Care Reform, 302 JAMA 1223, 1223 (2009).
102
The salary of an IPAB member in 2011 is $165,300. Rates of Basic Pay
for the Executive Schedule (EX): Rates Frozen at 2010 Levels: Effective January
2011,
U.S.
OFF.
PERSONNEL
MGMT.
(Jan.
2011),
http://www.opm.gov/oca/11tables/pdf/ex.pdf.
103
Memorandum from Christopher M. Davis, Analyst on Congress and the
Legislative Process & Henry B. Hogue, Analyst in American National Government to
Senator
Tom
Coburn
(Mar.
18,
2011),
available
at
http://coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=3fe9e198-fe6c4fb2-9777-88c69ff72356.
104
Two witnesses at a July 2011 “House Energy and Commerce Health Subcommittee session—American Enterprise Institute fellow Scott Gottlieb and Georgetown Public Policy Institute professor Judith Feder”—indicated they had discussed
IPAB appointment with the Obama administration. The Focus on Bringing Down
IPAB,
K AISER
H EALTH
N EWS
(July
14,
2011),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2011/July/14/ipab.aspx?p=1.
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problem is a mystery. The purpose of the lengthy term of service is to
send a strong message about the lack of revolving door opportunities
for the IPAB appointees. Willingness to serve (or lack thereof) under
such stringent limitations will only become evident as the program is
implemented.
C.

IPAB: Can It Work?

Because Medicare physician payments are so huge, it is tempting
to assume they are too large. But do we actually overpay for Medicare
physician services? To answer this we need to understand how
Medicare pays for physician services, how commercial insurance pays
for physician services, and the perverse relationship between the two.
1.

The Sustainable Growth Rate Formula

Earlier attempts have been made to tether the growth of Medicare
physician payments to GDP growth. Dating from the early 1990s, the
“much hated”105 sustainable growth rate (SGR) formula has hovered
over Medicare physician payment for decades. The SGR formula
requires cuts in Medicare reimbursements if total Medicare payments
to physicians exceed GDP growth by a certain amount.
However, SGR has never been implemented because Congress is,
and has been, unwilling to lower fees for all services.106 The
attraction of adjusting physician payments “with a scalpel”107 is that
some physician services are overpaid while others do not even cover
their costs. The challenge is to reduce the overvalued, raise the
undervalued, and do it all with a budget neutral outcome.108 To
attempt to gain the expertise necessary to accomplish this task,
Congress established MedPAC.

105

Maggie Mahar, Comparing the Fiscal Commission’s Proposals to the
Accountable
Care
Act,
HEALTH
BEAT
BLOG
(Dec.
2,
2010),
http://www.healthbeatblog.com/2010/12/comparing-the-fiscal-commissionsproposals-to-the-accountable-care-act.html.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
The relationship between Medicare payment system reform and the institutionalization of comparative effectiveness concerns into Medicare has made IPAB a
controversial entity. IPAB’s broader portfolio of responsibilities raises the question
of whether IPAB represent the introduction of command and control regulation into
health care, where it is rarely found. If the broader scope of responsibility makes
IPAB a comparative effectiveness agency as much as a Medicare payment system
reform entity, ought it not be explicitly acknowledged as such?
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MedPAC is and always has been an exclusively advisory body.109
Established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, MedPAC was
designed to advise Congress on fee-for-service Medicare payment
systems in addition to analyzing access and quality of care issues.
MedPAC has seventeen members who serve three-year renewable
terms on a part time basis. They are appointed by the Comptroller
General.110 MedPAC issues two reports—March and June each
year—to publicize its recommendations.111
2.

Will IPAB Do Better than MedPAC?

In contrast to the “oft-ignored” MedPAC,112 the IPAB is designed
to demand Congressional attention. Its recommendations become law
unless the House and the Senate adopt resolutions to block them. The
default impact on the Medicare entitlement program will empower
IPAB. Rather than proposing alternatives to the Medicare fee-forservice status quo, IPAB will drive the dimensions of the status quo.
Congress must take affirmative action to derail IPAB’s power, if it
wishes.
MedPAC was not abolished by the ACA, however. Nor is the
IPAB going to be a super-MedPAC.113 MedPAC’s mandate to review
the global health-care system is not replicated in the IPAB. MedPAC
also has substantial expertise to offer. MedPAC’s staff and expertise
are so valued, in fact, that MedPAC lives on under the ACA as the
Congressional advisory body that will review the IPAB’s
109

Senator Jay Rockefeller introduced legislation to transform MedPAC into
an independent executive agency, modeled on the Federal Reserve Board, in May of
2009. Other failed proposals, including one from Senator Tom Daschle, were to
create a health Fed designed to reach far beyond Medicare. Laura Yao, MedPAC is
Primed for Bigger Role in Health-Care Overhaul, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (June 3,
2009, 4:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/06/03/medpac-is-primed-forbigger-role-in-health-care-overhaul.
110
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/about/hcac/medpac.html (last visited Jan.
3, 2012).
111
See Documents, MEDPAC, http://www.medpac.gov/documents.cfm (last
visited Nov. 8, 2011) (select “Reports” in the “Document Type” field), for these
reports.
112
So the Commonwealth Fund’s health policy newsletter called it: John
Reichard, Washington Health Policy Week in Review the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission: Will it Matter Anymore?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 14, 2010),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Newsletters/Washington-Health-Policyin-Review/2010/May/May-17-2010/The-Medicare-Payment-Advisory-CommissionWill-It-Matter-Anymore.aspx
113
Robert A. Berenson, Implementing Health Care Reform—Why Medicare
Matters, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 102 (2010).
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recommendations. Whether or not the two entities will work in
tandem or at odds, for the foreseeable future they will co-exist, one
with the default authority to set Medicare payment policy and the
other with the mandate to advise Congress as to the wisdom of these
policy proposals. It is ironic that MedPAC’s most forceful role yet
may be as Congressional advisor on the IPAB.114
3.

IPAB’s Governance

IPAB’s governance and policy structure can be seen as a hybrid of
three previous attempts by Congress to tie itself to the mast and so
reduce political interference with extremely knotty and important, but
ultimately technocratic questions. These attempts resulted in the
creation of the Federal Reserve Board (Fed), the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission (BRAC).115
BRAC’s process began with published selection criteria for
military base closures, Secretary of Defense recommendations to the
independent commission, commission study (including public input)
of
these
recommendations,
and
ultimately,
commission
recommendations to the President. Like IPAB, Congress had a brief
window of opportunity to act on the commission’s report (on an all or
nothing basis) before the commission’s realignment and closure
recommendations became law.116 Although the IPAB’s scope of
authority is limited and based on a staged rollout, its decision-making
structure is similarly designed to be insulated from external influence.
The insight that “[e]veryone wants to lower costs until someone
tries to lower costs”117 could not be more applicable to the IPAB or to
Medicare reform in general. Whether the IPAB can deliver what has
been described as the framework for “learning to say no”118 will be its
biggest challenge. Although it is often thought that Medicare
beneficiaries most need to learn this lesson,119 it is likely the IPAB
114

Reichard, supra note 112.
BRAC was created for a fixed term by the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990. DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE & REALIGNMENT COMM’N, FINAL
REPORT
TO
THE
PRESIDENT
305
(2005),
available
at
http://www.brac.gov/docs/final/Chap2IssuesforFurtherConsideration.pdf.
116
42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(b)(3) (2010).
117
Benen, supra note 69.
118
Paul Krugman, Choices Must Be Made, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Apr. 20, 2011,
11:37 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/20/choices-must-be-made/.
119
Demand driven overconsumption by Medicare beneficiaries is traced to
the moral hazard inherent in all insurance coverage and amplified by the substantial
impact of Medicare secondary insurance (“Medigap”). See David M. Zimmer, The
115
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will have to deliver the message first to Medicare providers.
V.

THE IPAB’S INITIAL PRINCIPLE ASSIGNMENT
A.

Relative Value Units

It is significant that the scope of the IPAB’s authority and the
staging of its rollout combine to focus its first task on outpatient
physician services. Physician services billed to Part B account for
about 13 percent of all Medicare spending.120 Medicare uses a
physician fee schedule to determine physician payment rates. Values
are assigned based on the amount of work required for a listed service,
the expenses related to maintaining a practice,121 and liability
insurance costs.
Payments are updated yearly under the SGR formula, designed to
keep Medicare spending growth “consistent with growth in the
national economy.”122 The ACA establishes specific target growth
rates for Medicare and appoints the IPAB the guardian of those
goals.123 Just as physician conduct defeated the promise of the
Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS), discussed below, by
raising the volume of services provided,124 Medicare Volume
Performance Standards (VPS) have attempted to address increased
Medicare physician service volumes, as to both frequency and
intensity of services.
Physician payment system reform has
repeatedly and sequentially vacillated between a focus on
expenditures and a focus on costs without acknowledging the
relationship between the two.125
Relative weights or relative value units (RVUs) are the core of the
MPFS. RVUs are designed to account for the relative costliness of
resources used to provide each service and reflect the relative levels of
Relationship Between Medicare Supplemental Insurance and Health-Care Spending:
Selection Across Multiple Dimensions, 38 E. E CON . J. 118 (2012).
120
Physician Services Payment System, MEDPAC 1 (Oct. 2010),
www.medpac.gov/documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_10_Physician.pdf.
121
Geographic adjustments reflecting regional differences in wages, rent and
other costs are themselves controversial. Robert Pear, Report Finds Inequities in
Payments for Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2011, at A18.
122
Congress has regularly specified an update outside of the SGR formula.
Physician Services Payment System, supra note 120, at 1.
123
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Independent Payment Advisory Board, FRESHTHINKING 2.0 MEDICARE WORKSHOP 1 (May 3-4, 2010), available at
http://www.fresh-thinking.org/publications/IPAB_Jost.pdf.
124
William C. Hsiao, et al., Assessing the Implementation of PhysicianPayment Reform, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 928, 932-33 (1993).
125
JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 133 (2003).
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time, effort, skill, and stress involved.126 Physician services, in short,
have been distilled to these components: time, effort, skill, and stress.
The origins of assigning relative weights to physician effort and skill
trace back to the invention of RBRVS. Harvard Medical School
Professor William Hsiao rationalized the most common Medicare
physician services in a kind of medical time study, based on his
understanding of the time, effort, skill and stress involved in these
services in 1992.127 These relative weights are updated at least every
five years. As reported by MedPAC, “in completing its review, CMS
receives advice from a group of physicians and other professionals
sponsored by the AMA and physician specialty societies.”128
William Hsiao’s legacy is a system that systematically
undervalues cognitive services, and systematically overvalues medical
procedures.129
As a result, specialty physician services enjoy
continued dominance in the delivery and budget of the Medicare
program.
At this point, one would expect an authorial team including an
economist to sneer in Hayekian fashion at thumb-fingered government
regulatory bureaucracies. Government is one-size fits all and cannot
process detailed information; private actors in markets are more
efficient and flexible, economists might say. They must, under
pressure of competition, create better ways of classifying expenditures
and reimbursing providers than the rigid command-and-control
accounting system of Dr. William Hsiao.130
If the economist co-author were to say this, however, he would be
wrong. It is a fact that the bulk of private insurers use Dr. Hsiao’s
work and the RVS as a baseline against which to make their own

126

William C. Hsiao, et al., Estimating Physicians’ Work for a ResourceBased Relative-Value Scale, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 835, 835-36 (1988); Physician
Services Payment System: Payment Basics, MEDPAC 1 (Oct. 2009),
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/MedPAC_Payment_Basics_09_Physician.pdf.
127
Hsiao, supra note 126, at 835-36, 840. William Hsiao’s seminar RBRVS
research was conducted in 1985, published in 1988, adopted into the Medicare payment schedule in 1989, and took effect on January 1, 1992. History of the RBRVS,
AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutionsmanaging-your-practice/coding-billing-insurance/medicare/the-resource-basedrelative-value-scale/history-of-rbrvs.page (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
128
Physician Services Payment System, supra note 120, at 3.
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SLATE
MAG.
(Sept.
2,
2009),
http://www.slate.com/id/2227082/.
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See, most famously, F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35
AMER. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
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pricing and reimbursement decisions.131 The market cannot magically
create information out of thin air. It has to be created by somebody,
somewhere—and that somebody is Medicare. As the largest paying
unit in America’s health-care system, it would be surprising if
Medicare did not turn out to be both the price and the administrative
process leader whose judgments are taken as a baseline that other
purchasers use in making their own pricing and reimbursement
decisions.132
B.

The RVS Update Committee

The AMA and several national medical specialty societies created
the AMA/Specialty Society RVS Update Committee (RUC) to inject
its expertise into the RBRVS payment system review process.133 But
it has not been without controversy. MedPAC’s March 2010 report to
Congress recommended limiting Medicare’s unit prices,134 and the
ACA requires HHS to periodically review these relative codes with
special attention to potentially “mis-valued” codes.135 This is because
CMS has shown tremendous deference to RUC recommendations.136
RUC’s recommendations are accepted by CMS 94 percent of the
time.137 Anything that disturbs the order of this will be worldview
changing.
CMS’s deference to RUC does not come after a long experiment
with command and control regulation tempered by the
acknowledgment that self-regulation may prove the wiser course. The
RUC has been captured since its inception.138 If capture represents a
131
Jon Harris-Shapiro and Marcia S. Greenstein, RBRVS—1999 Update, 26 J.
HEALTH CARE FIN. 48, 48 (1999).
132
Henry G. Dove, Use of the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale for Private Insurers, 13 HEALTH AFF. 193, 198 (1994).
133
Barbara Levy, The RUC—Providing Valuable Expertise to the Medicare
Program for Twenty Years, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 28, 2011),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2011/March/032811levy.aspx.
134
MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY xiii
(2010), available at www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar10_EntireReport.pdf.
135
42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-4(c)(2)(K)(i)(II) (2010).
136
Gina Shaw, Is the RUC Broken?, NEUROLOGY TODAY, Nov. 18, 2010, at
20, 20.
137
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CUTTING
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(Nov.
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2010),
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?
article=21768&pageid=22&pagename=Investigation.
138
AM. MED. ASS’N, THE RUC: RECENT ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE
VALUATION OF PRIMARY CARE SERVICES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/rbrvs/rucbotreport.pdf (“The original
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regulated industry dominating the creation and enforcement of a
regulation,139 then the establishment and operation of RUC embodies
capture of a more nuanced type. Here we have capture of the
outpatient physician payment schedule by one group of providers to
the exclusion of others. Yet RUC is a poster child for how secret,
unmonitored self-regulation does not manifest the upside of capture,
where voluntary compliance improves regulatory outcomes.140
It has been observed that “[a]lthough some consider the volumegenerating incentives of current payment systems so perverse that
they would not spend much time correcting existing mispriced values
. . . it will be necessary to correct mispricing and other flaws in
existing fee-for-service payment systems in order to ultimately
dismantle them.”141 Indeed, if we do not assess and correct for the
contribution of overvalued services to Medicare’s cost-inflation, we
run the risk of building the same defects into any future Medicare
payment and delivery system. The kind of morphic resonance142 that
leads us to design a system that systematically undervalues the
services we should value the most will require a thorough morphology
to avoid replication.
IPAB’s assignment to consider RUC’s
contribution to medical inflation, as a result, is both medically and
politically freighted.143
C.

Why Medicare Physician Reimbursement Relative
Value Units Should Matter to IPAB

Medicare’s relative value scale is the foundation of the MPFS.
The roughly 7,000 RVUs in Medicare’s relative value scale are
supposed to reflect true relative practices costs.144 Rapid advances in

intent was to include all major specialties, primarily defined as the 24 Member Boards
of the American Board of Medical Specialties.”).
139
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141
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medical technology require RVU adjustments over time.145 The
RBRVS determines prices based on physician work (52 percent),
practice expense (44 percent), and malpractice expense (4 percent).
Although all of the RBRVS components are contentious,146 CMS
relies heavily on RUC to assist it with this task.147 RUC is a group of
twenty-nine physicians drawn from a variety of medical specialties.
Specifically, RUC is composed of a chair, six AMA committee
representatives, and twenty-three members at large.148
When RUC was first formed, representatives were requested from
each of the specialties within the American Board of Medical
Specialties, except for neurology.149 Medical specialties have evolved
significantly since that time. Although neurology is now represented
on RUC, geriatricians, oncologists, and gastroenterologists are now
excluded from RUC seats. Neurology’s later addition is consistent
with neurology’s transformation from a patient-oriented to a
procedure-oriented focus.150 As each specialty delegate’s vote is
limited to one equally weighted seat, the valuation of the work of all
physicians is set by physicians almost entirely outside of the relevant
specialty.151 Inevitably, patient-oriented services are systematically
devalued. The vast majority of voting status representatives on RUC
are procedural- or surgery-focused specialties.152 Medicare requires
145
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(Aug.
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See STEPHEN G. WAXMAN, FROM NEUROSCIENCE TO NEUROLOGY:
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NEUROLOGY vii (2005).
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Medical specialties with RUC voting status include: anesthesiology, cardiology, colon and rectal surgery, dermatology, emergency medicine, family medicine,
general surgery, internal medicine, nephrology, neurology, neurosurgery, obstetrics/gynecology, ophthalmology, orthopedic surgery, otolaryngology, pathology,
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that all RUC relative value adjustments be budget-neutral as well. 153
RUC, in short, pits representatives of “face time” or evaluationand management-intensive providers against procedure-driven
providers in the division of the MPFS pie. The very composition of
RUC favors providers of invasive, high-technology procedures over
primary care and cognitive medicine providers. This outcome was
predicted at RUC’s founding because of the rise of “lucrative
outpatient diagnostic studies” as a growth sector.154 This prediction
has been particularly prescient. Entire medical specialties—such as
family practitioners and geriatricians—do few high-technology
procedures, the sine qua non of relative value in the MPFS.
Ironically, it is these same evaluation- and management-intensive
primary care providers that approve or direct significant amounts in
health-care spending per work day.155
The current chair of RUC explains the weighting of procedural
over cognitive specialties by noting that RUC was never meant to be a
representative body.156 Although this rationale has been met with
considerable scorn by primary care physicians,157 it contains more
than a kernel of truth. Primary care physicians bemoan their
exclusion from RUC and the fact that each seat is filled by a physician
who acts as an advocate for a given specialty.158 Nevertheless, the
lessons that can be extracted from RUC’s “failed experiment”159 are
substantial.
Specialty physicians dominate the RUC. This has significance
for both Medicare cost inflation and care delivery. American
medicine is specialty physician dominated, with primary care
physicians160 comprising less than half of the total physician group.
153
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By contrast, virtually all European countries have a broad generalist
physician foundation comprising 70–80 percent of all practicing
physicians.161 The conventional explanation for the primary care and
specialty physician distribution in the United States is that primary
care is underpaid and undervalued. It is less-often noted that specialty
care is concomitantly overvalued,162 and the mechanisms by which
these perverse outcomes are institutionalized are rarely scrutinized.
Without such scrutiny, it is hard to know how a system that rightly
values the most efficient Medicare physician services can be
implemented.
RUC offers a vivid example of how administered pricing schemes
can be captured by those who would benefit from overpayments.163 It
has also been suggested that RBRVS is destined to produce misvalued codes and that overvalued codes will always lead to spending
growth.164
If this is true, the problem with health-care
overconsumption and overpayment is larger than the problem of
Medicare physician payment. If it is also true that an estimated 30
percent of health-care services are unnecessary or duplicative,165 it is
worth considering how to wring the most obvious inefficiencies out of
the system. Reforming RUC would be an excellent place to start.
D.

Reforming RUC

CMS has been urged to seek independence from RUC when
recalibrating RVUs.166
MedPAC has recommended that an
independent body of experts, composed of a group extending beyond
physicians to economists and third-party payers, review RUC
recommendations.167 It has also been suggested that the IPAB play

Alan Lazaroff, MD, Appointed to RUC Administrative Subcommittee; Update on
AGS Response to AAFP’s Proposed Changes to the RUC Structure (Aug. 12, 2011),
available at http://www.americangeriatrics.org/press/id:2311.
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301, 303 (2007).
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this role.168 These recommendations, of course, assume that the
difficulties of government central planning in health-care markets
would be remedied by a differently-composed RUC alone.
Reformulating RUC would also have significant implications for
inpatient care. Just as outpatient Medicare physician services have
been shaped by RUC’s role in recalibrating RVU’s, acute care
hospitals have oriented much of their service provision toward high
value RVUs and high value RVU specialty groups such as
cardiology.169
RUC operates in substantial obscurity.170 Although the identity of
RUC appointees is available within the AMA, this information has not
been widely circulated. In addition to being disproportionately
oriented towards procedural medical specialties, RUC’s current
appointees are disproportionately male and southern171 . In addition,
almost half of the members of RUC have financial relationships with
pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology companies, device
companies, health-care providers, and health insurance companies. 172
Nevertheless, the AMA asserts that RUC members “exercise their
independent judgment and are not advocates for their specialty.”173
The effect of bias is difficult to measure since RUC’s votes are
confidential174 RUC is reported to have a conflict of interest policy,
although it is unknown. The meetings are closed, but CMS is
reported to have observers at each meeting.175
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The single most important thing to know about RUC is that it has
used “flawed and capricious methodologies”176 to produce a system
that is itself fundamentally flawed. These flaws harm both patients
and taxpayers. Not coincidentally, they also harm primary care
providers and purchasers. The second most important thing to know
about RUC is that it develops new RVUs, and CMS approves them.177
Historically, it has taken several years to develop and value new
codes.178 Needless to say, RUC moves slowly.
RUC serves providers poorly, yet it not been abandoned by
providers. This is because RUC serves certain providers very well,
and only disserves primary care providers. The largest primary care
medical society, the American Academy of Family Physicians
(AAFP), is currently studying the implications of abandoning RUC.179
The potentially destabilizing effect of such a decision by an entity
representing roughly 10 percent of the country’s primary care
providers cannot be ignored. AAFP’s New Jersey and Florida
chapters have already called for the AAFP to quit RUC.180
Most recently, a Maryland-based group of primary care
physicians has brought suit against CMS for ceding control of the
Secretary’s rulemaking process to RUC and for failing to properly
constitute the RUC as a Federal Advisory Committee.181 Although
the case has only recently been filed, review of CMS’s memorandum
in support of its 12(b)(6) motion indicates that CMS takes the position
that RUC is a creature of the AMA and not a federal advisory
committee.182 It remains to be seen whether the most significant
CARE
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Aug. 8, 2011), 2011 WL 3665650.
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byproduct of this litigation will be an airing of RUC’s operation.
What is clear is that CMS appears unwilling to cede ground on their
position that the Medicare statute does not permit either
administrative or judicial review of the determination of relative
values.183
Although primary care physician distaste for RUC is apparent, it
is rarely noted that RUC also serves patients poorly, though it has not
been attacked by patients. This is because few patients understand
RUC and the implications of its valuation of physician services for the
quality, quantity, and cost of care that they receive. Also, patients are
the ultimate end-users of health care in our hybrid system. As such,
they are also often insulated from cost and a comprehensive
understanding of health-care cost drivers.
If RUC serves payors so poorly, why has it not been abandoned?
Payors, including the biggest payor of them all, the United States
government, have been reluctant to abandon RUC in light of the
failure to identify a clearly superior alternative. RUC embodies many
of the flaws of self-regulated fee-for-service medicine while also
embodying the political stalemate over funding physician services
through government-funded health insurance, leaving many persuaded
that progress is impossible. In addition, primary care providers have
not leveraged their role as the specialty care referral base into
financial concessions from other physicians.184
Even the modest proposal that any medical services valuation
panel include a broader array of health-care experts (including nonprovider experts)185 has met with ferocious criticism from
providers.186 More ambitious proposals (e.g., requiring CMS to fund
direct surveys of medical practice and resources)187 scarcely see the
light of day.
It has become an anathema to mention financial incentives for
physicians when discussing reform of payment for physician services
under government-funded health insurance. Yet, since physician
decisions drive most health-care costs, it is impossible to address
physician payment without addressing physician motivation. As a
183
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result, in our public discourse we simply talk around the issue.
Unfortunately, continued specialty physician dominance of the
physician services valuation system stifles the discourse about
whether physician services are appropriately valued and the larger
discourse about self-regulation in government-funded health
insurance. Given the current stalemate over how to proceed, we
might learn from the stalemate that plagues the debate regarding
acceptable growth rates for physician services payments.
E.

The Physician Payment Sustainable Growth Rate
Formula

Controls on aggregate Medicare physician spending have helped
suppress the growth of Medicare costs188 over the last three decades.189
The staged introduction of Medicare’s prospective payment systems
have demonstrated that spending growth is responsive to policy
interventions,190 but not all reforms have worked equally well in all
settings. Excess spending growth in physician and clinical services
has proven particularly intransigent.191 The story of why this is so—
why excess Medicare spending growth in hospital care expenses has
been tamed by changes in Medicare’s payment policies, and why
excess Medicare spending growth in physician services has not—
helps to explain the IPAB’s design and function. It is the story of the
failure of Congress to implement Medicare’s SGR formula for
Medicare physician services that helps to explain the IPAB’s impetus.
Congress has affirmatively refused to change the payment
incentives for doctors, while acknowledging physician decisions drive
most health-care costs, because physicians have not embraced
Medicare physician payment reform.192 Congress has now decided to
take matters out of its own hands: “All Congress can do is fully
replace an IPAB recommendation with a reform that saves the same
amount of money or muster both a supermajority and a presidential
188
Medicare’s excess growth or spending growth beyond what may be attributed to general economic growth is often referred to as Medicare inflation or Medicare’s growth rate. Bending the cost curve refers to the capacity to limit Medicare’s
spending growth to what may be attributed to general economic growth. The LongTerm Outlook for Health Care Spending, supra note 8.
189
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signature to stop IPAB from acting. Either path requires a lot more
effort than undermining cost control does right now.”193
Ambivalent about physician reimbursement’s role in Medicare
excess spending, Congress has intermittently frozen fee levels,194
reduced fees for certain procedures,195 and introduced a fee schedule
with spending targets.196 Even more ambivalent about its role in
keeping excess Medicare physician growth in check, Congress has
overridden the fee schedule consistently and regularly since its
introduction in 1992.197
The SGR formula requires that if the growth of Medicare’s total
payments to physicians exceeds GDP growth by a certain amount in a
given year, reimbursements will decrease. Medicare adopted the SGR
formula in the 1990’s as part of the Gingrich-Clinton balanced budget
negotiations. However, the SGR did not begin to bind until 2003,
when the growth of Medicare’s total benefits per beneficiary exceeded
the growth rate of GDP per capita. Then the across-the-board cuts to
physicians accepting Medicare assignments mandated by the SGR
formula began to accumulate.
Congress promptly postponed
implementation of the SGR. Congress has yet to allow the SGR
formula to kick in. Because the SGR formula cuts Medicare
payments to all physicians—well-compensated or otherwise —it has
raised concerns of reduced access to care for Medicare beneficiaries.
And, because the SGR formula is a rallying cry for organized
medicine’s fear of falling income and status, it has a perverse
usefulness to its proponents and opponents alike. Unfortunately,
“virtually everyone in Washington understands that the SGR formula
will never be implemented.”198
The cumulative unimplemented cuts are now projected to equal a
29.4 percent SGR cut in the Medicare physician growth rate.199
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Acknowledging that a January 1, 2012 29.5 percent cut to Medicare
physician payments would be detrimental to beneficiary access to
care,200 MedPAC urged Congress to resolve the SGR formula
conundrum. By October of 2011, MedPAC’s dissatisfaction with the
SGR formula had escalated to the point of urging its repeal and
replacement by a yearly schedule of specified updates for the
physician fee schedule as well as a 17 percent across-the-board cut in
Medicare specialty fees.201 But specialty physician pushback has been
substantial.202
In light of this, several options are now on the table. One option
would be to embrace the 29.4 percent SGR-related cut to the Medicare
physician growth rate. This would almost certainly cause some
contraction in those physicians accepting Medicare assignment, but
would likely not lead to the alarmist prediction of the wholesale
collapse of Medicare assignment.203 Among private physicians,
Medicare is the preferred payer, with about 93 percent of American
physicians willing to accept Medicare beneficiaries as patients.204
Embracing the 29.4 percent SGR-related cut to the Medicare
physician growth rate would mean Medicare might deepen its
reputation as a less than optimal payor without harming its reputation
as a reliable and, consequently, favored payor.205 If past is prologue,
however, we are unlikely to have the chance to find out what such a
significant cut to Medicare physician growth rate would mean for
Medicare beneficiaries. This option is unpalatable to Congress.206
http://www.modernphysician.com/article/20110615/MODERNPHYSICIAN/3061599
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A second option would, much as MedPac has only recently done,
be to abandon the SGR formulation entirely and urge Congress to
develop a revised physician payment system.207 Abandoning the SGR
formulation would reduce provider interest in Medicare physician
payment reform, however.
A third option would be to use the looming SGR-related cut to
generate pressure to establish a new Medicare physician services
payment system, an approach advanced by the National Commission
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform.208
Instead, Congress has routinely overridden the SGR and MedPAC
continues to spin out proposals to resolve the SGR formula dilemma,
most recently no fewer than four potential fixes centered around
simply repealing the SGR.
In the meantime, the ACA’s launch of the IPAB draws closer, in
the face of a constitutional challenge to its validity. This challenge,
often hidden in the shadow of other constitutional attacks on the
ACA, merits some thought.
VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO IPAB
A.

Separation of Powers

The IPAB’s lynchpin is the limitation of specialty physician
control over discussions about Medicare physician reimbursement.
This process is described disparagingly as “government of, by, and for
supposedly disinterested experts,”209 and the IPAB’s mission is to
insulate the conversation about cost effective Medicare
reimbursement rates from specialty provider dominance. The IPAB’s
operational model does, in fact, substitute one group of
congressionally-authorized and executive branch-selected health-care
207
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experts for the specialty physician experts who dominate RUC.
Ultimately, both the status quo and the IPAB’s model involve
extensive use of experts. The status quo unofficially delegates
authority to specialty physicians through the RUC process and the
ACA explicitly delegates authority to the IPAB.
Among the twenty-eight federal cases challenging the ACA, the
Goldwater Institute’s Coons v. Geithner210 frames the separation of
powers challenge to the IPAB’s organization around the broad
authority delegated to the IPAB by Congress. Asserting that the ACA
“provides almost no limit on and no intelligible standard constraining
the exercise of legislative power by IPAB,” the complaint seeks to test
the modern parameters of Supreme Court deference to Congressional
delegation of authority.211
Congressional authority to delegate power under broad general
directives is recognized as necessary for Congress to resolve
especially technical problems.212 The limit on congressional authority
to delegate lies in the requirement that Congress include an
“intelligible principle” to guide the conduct of agent.213
The IPAB’s statutory mandate is to find ways to “reduce the per
capita rate of growth in Medicare spending.”214 This mandate is
constrained by the requirements that the proposals be specific, focus
on extending Medicare solvency, and protect and improve Medicare
beneficiaries’ access to necessary and evidence-based items and
services.215 The ACA’s guidance for the exercise of the IPAB’s
discretion is substantial, substantially broader than the intelligible
principle identified in the Emergency Price Control Act litigated in
Yakus v. United States. There, the congressional mandate was to set
prices at levels “generally fair and equitable,”216 with the specific
parameters of discretion read into the statute from the legislative
history.217 The substantial discretion granted to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services in transforming the IPAB’s
210
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recommendations as they are forwarded to Congress raises questions
about the permissible scope of the intelligible principle created to
guide the conduct of the agent.218
The IPAB’s authorizing legislation is remarkably detailed as to
the limitations on its authority. It is these very detailed limitations
that make IPAB’s task so daunting.219 In addition, the Supreme Court
has shown remarkable deference to congressional delegation of
authority. The only two Supreme Court cases indicating federal
statutes lacked the necessary intelligible principle to constrain board
or agency action concerned delegations of authority lacking the
ACA’s substantial limitations on IPAB authority.220 In addition, no
law has been struck down under a delegation challenge since the
1930s.221 IPAB’s framers were careful to constrain its authority over
matters beyond Medicare payment reform.
CONCLUSION
In order to blunt resistance to Medicare by physician interest
groups, President Lyndon Johnson proposed a payments system for
Medicare with minimal oversight: doctors would charge Medicare
what they charged their other patients for the services that they, the
doctors, deemed to be medically appropriate. But while private
insurers and individuals paying out-of-pocket could, and did, inquire
as to how appropriate and necessary the various procedures were,
Medicare, as originally established, did not.
By the 1980s it was clear that if Medicare was to be sustained
over the long run it needed more oversight of the payments system.
The option chosen was Dr. William Hsiao’s “medical Taylorism”:222
determine how much it ought to cost to treat this condition and
perform this service—based on the locality and the time, effort, skill,
and stress involved—and then base Medicare reimbursement rates on
218
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that determination. Once again, however, the system is out of
balance. Just as insurance company regard for bottom lines and
household regard for individual spending were missing from the
original system, so too the current system overvalues specialty
medical procedures, because specialists have the expertise, free time,
and incentive to shape the process in their own interest.
The IPAB is designed to redress this imbalance. With publiclyannounced membership and open procedures, the IPAB is designed to
bring conversations over Medicare physician compensation into the
public forum. The Obama administration is placing many of its longrun hopes for sustaining the social insurance system on the IPAB.
Even though the IPAB will not to spring into existence until 2012,
throughout 2011 the same principles governed President Obama’s
federal health-care spending control strategy: “by strengthening an
independent commission of doctors, nurses, medical experts, and
consumers who will look at all the evidence and recommend the best
ways to reduce unnecessary spending while protecting access to the
services that seniors need.”223
Expert boards have always run the risk of being captured by the
industry that they are supposed to regulate. Indeed, the Medicare
reimbursement process has already been captured, and the need to
substitute an open and informed process for the RUC’s rubberstamping of specialist-driven outpatient physician service valuation is
great. The Medicare payment systems bellwether status means that
commercial insurance consumers and payers would also benefit from
bringing the discussion of the systematic overvaluation of specialty
care and devaluation of primary care out into the open.
The ACA is peppered with programs designed to raise the status
and value of primary care providers. But all of this will be for naught
if primary care services are not properly validated and valued in
Medicare.
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